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ABSTRACT 
 
Palenchar and Heath (2006) claim that, “organizations find reason to 
implement programs whereby they increase the public’s understanding of 
technical processes as a means for lessening the fear of the threatening 
unknown and of increasing trust.”  The research being proposed will hold the 
British Petroleum Company (BP) to these standards as they relate to 
communicating emanating from BP before, during, and after the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster of 2010.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
On April 20th, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon offshore oil rig, whose 
furthest extremities stretched the length of fourteen Empire State buildings, 
began a nearly three-month series of catastrophic events that would later be 
recognized as the largest environmental disaster in American history 
(Lustgarten, 2012). The lives of eleven people as well as almost five million 
barrels of oil were lost. Blame for the event was placed on a myriad of factors 
– from freak occurrences to corporate greed. An internal survey of rig workers 
serving on the Deepwater Horizon showed that, “Many workers on the 
Deepwater Horizon oil rig were concerned about safety in the weeks before 
the 20 April explosion but feared reprisals if they reported problems,”(Kollewe, 
2010). In the confidential survey, workers raised concerns that rig equipment 
was unreliable, “Which they believed was as a result of drilling priorities taking 
precedence over planned maintenance,” (Urbina, 2010).  
While the measurement of public perception in the days following the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster have been covered in other bodies of research, 
such pre-event perception that was measured in the aforementioned survey 
of employees should be applied to the community member’s affected by 
events such as the Deepwater Horizon. This research marks an effort to 
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analyze how informed, via official online media, of risk Louisianans were prior 
to the events of April 20th, 2010. Was much of the risk of offshore drilling 
purposefully withheld, improperly communicated according to risk 
communication theory principles, or simply unknown to British Petroleum 
officials? It is the researcher’s intention to illustrate a connection between 
corporate interest and poor risk communication strategies employed pre-
incident. Special emphasis has been placed on the use of technical language, 
a byproduct of a risk society reliant upon industry experts as communicators 
(Giddons, 1991), and the evolution of BP’s online resources after the 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
LITERATURE REVIEW: COMMUNICATION IN THE RISK SOCIETY 
 
To illustrate BP’s role within risk society and as conveyers of risk 
communication, literature detailing the qualities of risk society purveyors and 
the qualities of effective risk communication has been reviewed. The rise of 
offshore drilling in the 1980’s allowed for the framing of risk society 
cornerstones as they relate to Reagan-era neoliberal ideology. Texts from the 
study of risk communication have been reviewed to provide an assessment of 
BP’s specific strength and weakness as risk communicators within the risk 
society.  
RISK SOCIETY 
 
Both the human health and environmental dangers posed by modern 
day oil extraction technologies are a product of a risk society, a sociological 
concept asserting that our contemporary society and its continued economic 
growth is inextricably linked with unprecedented hazards and risks (Beck, 
1992). The reliance on technological tools within contemporary society, 
represents a dichotomy from the risk our ancestors experienced. Prior to 
World War II, humans were subjected to risks posed by the natural world such 
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as floods and famine. In contrast, risk societies craft and take deliberate risks. 
For members living in a such a society, the risk is endemic (Barbosa, 2009). 
A cornerstone of risk society theory is that a citizen’s access to 
information regarding hazards to the environment and human health are 
restricted (Beck, 1992). While such information can be purposefully withheld 
from citizens, such as cases of proprietary technology that is sheiled from the 
public eye via embargos and patent law, much censorship of inherent risk is 
unintentional as, “technologies require multiple specialized experts who 
create abstract knowledge systems that are incomprehensible to the majority 
of citizens,” (Giddens, 1991). In simpler terms, as technology and knowledge 
trek forward at a quickening pace, “many are left behind, panting in ignorance, 
increasingly unable to understand and control the machines on which they 
depend,” (Barbosa, 2009). 
 This lack of understanding is fueled by an increased economic and 
societal dependence upon specialized experts. These leaders in their 
respective fields craft complex knowledge systems that are indecipherable by 
the general population (Giddens, 1991).  Workers bear the brunt of the risk 
posed by technological progress. A former resident of Love Canal, New York, 
a site considered to be one of the more egregious environmental events in 
American history, expressed, “Communities perceive many flaws in risk 
assessment. The first is who is being asked to take the risk and who is getting 
the benefit. From a community’s perspective, risk assessments are ‘the risks 
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that someone else has chosen for you to take,” (Gibbs, 1994). 
 Beck (1991) suggests that, as a result, citizens have lost faith in the 
institutions of modernity. Catastrophic events that occurred from a lack of 
foresight and proper risk assessment performed by science and industry 
elites have tainted public trust in them. While scientists weigh the distribution 
of risks and errors as a part of technological expansion, many of the said risks 
and errors are created by science itself (Barbosa, 2009).  For example, while 
nuclear power technology has become a reality, the same scientists who 
helped to mold the technology into its usable form have weighed potential 
risks and expressed to the public that said technology is safe.  As citizens are 
forced to rely upon these scientific institution’s experts for vital information, 
events such as the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl disasters have sown 
distrust of industry officials (Barbosa, 2009).  
 The architect of risk society theory argues that, “the more emphatically 
the existence of world risk society is denied, the more easily it can become a 
reality,” (Beck, 2006). Therefore, it is crucial to produce and distribute 
accurate risk assessments quantify so that effective policies can be 
formulated. The oil extraction industry is a prominent risk society participant 
because of its expansive production of toxic substances on which 
contemporary society depends.      
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 This research analyzes the communication of potential risks that 
preceded the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Risk society markers in the 
technology and practices of offshore drilling will be highlighted, and media 
practices and the dissemination of risk information to the public will be 
audited.  
 
NEOLIBERALISM AS A FUEL FOR RISK SOCIETY 
 
The ideology of neoliberalism asserts that, “human well-being can best 
be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within and 
institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual 
liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade,” (Harvey, 2007). Scholars 
critical of neoliberalism point to dangerous deregulation and resulting crises, 
such as the 1987 stock market crash, and the numerous corporate scandals 
of the 1990s (Marino, Mayper, and Tolleson).   
Almost half a century before the Reagan era of neoliberalism took 
shape, political economist Karl Polanyi predicted that, “to allow the market 
mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural 
environment would result in the demolition of society.” (1944, p. 76) Seventy 
years after Polanyi’s prediction, sociologist Charles Perrow deemed that such 
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fears had come to fruition as, “we have moved from public oversight to a 
system wherein regulators cooperate with the regulated,” (2015, p. 203).  
Over the last three decades, the United States, “has retreated from its 
regulatory responsibility over private-sector economic activities,” (Perrow, 
2015, p. 203). In the 2000’s alone, government deregulation was blamed for 
events ranging from West Virginia’s Upper Big Branch mine explosion to 
declining work conditions for air traffic controllers that have resulted in the 
loss of human lives (Eley, 2011).   
Consumers are protected via a common form of risk communication, 
that which, “provide(s) labels and other information for informing consumers 
about product risks and safe use practices,” (Baram, 1985, ). In determining if 
risk communication practices performed by a company are within legal 
boundaries, “Certain criteria favorable to persons at risk are used in the courts 
to determine if company communication practices were adequate…” (Baram, 
1985, p. 38). More specifically, the greater potential for harm that a 
company’s practices or products presents, “the more precise, clear, and 
obvious the warning must be to be found adequate,” (Baram, 1985, p. 39).  
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RISK COMMUNICATION 
 
Successful dissemination of information within the realm of risk 
communication theory is described as that which, “raises the level of 
understanding of relevant issues or actions for those involved and satisfies 
them that they are adequately informed within the limits of available 
knowledge,” (Improving Risk Communication, 1989). Several federal laws 
outlaw corporation’s responsibility in properly implementing risk 
communication, from emergency planning and community right-to-know to 
environmental justice in minority populations (Lundgren and McMakin, 2004).  
To evaluate a text’s ability to raise the level of understanding of a 
content consumer, researchers studying risk communication through content 
analysis, “Identify themes within a dataset and comparing those themes to the 
study purpose and existing literature,” (Penney et al, 2011).  For the purpose 
of this research, Penney et al’s 2011 research on risk communication and 
informed consent served as a basis for the risk communication terms selected 
for content analysis.   
Theories of risk communication cover communication methods both 
preemptive in nature and those that result from questions arising from 
communities, politicians, and activists concerned about potential ill effects of 
industry. In the event that risk is not properly communicated by industry 
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officials, “health, safety and environmental concerns remain at the forefront of 
media, community and public policy discussions,” (Palenchar and Heath, 
2006).  
As risk society theory claims that information is restricted due complex 
knowledge systems created by experts in a given field, the scientific 
positivism element of risk communication echoes this sentiment, “data and 
methodologies of scientists dominate community efforts to ascertain the 
degree of risk and subsequent communications about the risk on behalf of the 
community,” (Renn, 1992). According to the US Environmental Protection 
Agency (1993), “empowering the public with information helps assure 
[industry] compliance with existing laws and encourages companies to take 
additional measures to reduce industrial chemical releases.”   
Study in the field of risk communication often resides in one of two 
paradigms that assert, “whether risk is a technical matter that is determined 
objectively or a social construction that emerges from communication among 
experts, affected parties, and public agencies,” (Cox, 2006). The former 
perspective, known as the technical model of risk, is criticized for its emphasis 
on communication deemed, “too often restricted to a technical sphere and 
thus excludes those who are most effected,” (Cox, 2006). The architect of 
Risk Society theory, Ulrich Beck encapsulated the problems with a solely 
technical approach to risk by stating, “there is a big difference between those 
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who take risks and those who are victimized by the risks others take,” (Beck, 
1998). As risk society theory claims that information is restricted due complex 
knowledge systems created by experts in a given field, the scientific 
positivism element of risk communication echoes the sentiment that, “data 
and methodologies of scientists dominate community efforts to ascertain the 
degree of risk and subsequent communications about the risk on behalf of the 
community,” (Renn, 1992).  
In response to the technical domination of risk communications, the 
cultural-experiential model was formed. This model deviates from the 
technical model of risk in that it seeks to highlight, “attention to the 
experiences of a community that might be left out of technical calculations,” 
(Cox, 2006). Communications in this vein take into account familiar and often 
personal concerns within its language forgoing technical information that may 
be difficult to understand for the general population. Researchers of risk 
communication note that this model allows for, “requests of information 
regarding the experience and views of impacted populations and their 
assessment of risk,” (Caron and Serrell, 2009).  
These models provide an important lens through which to view content 
analyses of risk communication texts. By performing counts of technical 
language use, industry-specific terms, and overall complex language 
appropriate for high-reading level adults, risk communicator can be mapped 
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as conformers of the technical model of risk communication or the cultural 
model.  Risk communication researchers have stated that industries who are 
communicating risk to the general public will find more effective avenues of 
communication via the cultural model than the technical model of risk 
communication (Cox, 2006). With this knowledge, organizations can make a 
conscious effort to adopt language changes that are more understood by their 
audience. 
 
BP AND NEOLIBERALISM: THE RENEGADE REFINER 
 
British Petroleum’s foray into offshore drilling began in 1964 with the 
conversion of a barge into an offshore drilling rig named Sea Gem. Anchored 
42 miles off the shores of Britain, this platform was projected to tap into 10 
million cubic feet of oil, “enough to supply the fuel needs of a town of 300,000 
people,” (Britain: Sinking of the Sea Gem, 1996). Two years into operation the 
rig collapsed resulting in the total loss of the platform and the death of 13 
crew members (On this day: Sea Gem oil rig collapses, n.d.).  
The sinking of Sea Gem, as well as the subsequent sinking and spills 
of other company’s rigs, led to a tightening of internal safety and technical 
policies within the realm of explosion protection, management and 
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administration, rescue, and rig construction (Pickering, 1994). Despite initial 
resistance from BP to adopt a statuary safety code for their offshore drilling 
rigs, the exploration of factors contributing to Sea Gem’s demise softened 
BP’s opposition to policy recommendations put forth by a British government 
inquiry committee (Kemp, 2014).  
Though the loss of BP’s first offshore drilling rig was a major financial 
and loss of legal freedom for the company, the development was already 
underway to begin the operation of BP’s second offshore drilling rig as crews 
began clearing the wreckage of Sea Gem (TIME, 1996). 
Today BP can no longer be found off the shore of their home country 
but instead in Alaska, the US lower 48, and the Gulf of Mexico, currently 
home to eight BP owned and/or operated rigs (Exploration and Production, 
2017). With American shores promising a greater delivery upon investment 
due to the presence of large oil deposits, BP’s exploration of the United 
State’s crude oil extraction potential has proved mutually beneficial to the 
coffers of both BP and the American government. 
Outside of funds collected by the Internal Revenue Service, the 
program leasing offshore oil resources has been the largest official source of 
revenue for the American federal government (Freudenberg, 1994). Unlike oil 
rich countries such as Iraq and Russia, free enterprise in the oil business 
within the United States can be traced back to the earliest days of oil drilling in 
the country. Not unlike other industries in America, the business of oil 
 13 
 
extraction was heavily influenced by the wave of neoliberalism that began 
cresting within the Regan presidency.  
Much of the current oversight of offshore oil drilling in the early 2000s 
was performed by the Mineral Management Service (MMS), an agency 
created during the Regan presidency and headed by secretary of the interior, 
James Watt, one of the most anti-environmental political appointees in 
American history (Freudenburg & Gramling, 2011).  British Petroleum, now 
known as BP, was accused of showing influence within the MMS having 
convinced agency officials that the oil companies themselves could best 
asses the marine impacts of their operations as well as persuading regulators 
to ease existing public notification rules (Ladd, 2012). Within the 2010 MMS 
annual report, released before the events of Deepwater Horizon, it was 
concluded that more stringent rig regulations were superfluous given that 
industry practices were considered failsafe (Kennedy, 2010; Whitty, 2010).  
A commission name by President Obama to investigate the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill noted that, “MMS became an agency systematically lacking 
the resources, technical training or experience in petroleum engineering that 
is absolutely critical to ensuring that offshore drilling is being conducted in a 
safe and responsible manner,” (Report to the President, 2011). The Obama 
administration retooled the MMS in October of 2011 to become the Bureau of 
Ocean Management, Regulation and Enforcement. Critics were quick to note 
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that changes to the organization were, “only cosmetic changes and remains 
too close to the people it is supposed to regulate,” (Broder and Krauss, 2011).  
BP’s ability to directly influence political elites became even more clear 
after Vice President Dick Cheney, within months of taking office, “held secret 
energy task force meetings with more than 100 oil officials to draw up a wish 
list of industry demands to be implemented by the oil-friendly administration,” 
(Ladd, 2012).  Shortly afterward, a federal executive order set forth a 
requirement that the federal government was to expedite offshore drilling 
practices (Bolstad, 2010). Within this atmosphere of deregulation, BP 
garnered a reputation among OSHA officials as being, “the Renegade 
Refiner,” (Freudenburg & Gramling, 2011, p. 42).  
From 2008 until the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, oil and gas 
companies spent more than $340 million on lobbying efforts in congress. BP 
CEO Tony Hayward increased his company’s lobbying budget to $15.9 million 
in 2009 specifically in order to dilute new laws aimed at preventing oil spill 
pollution (Kocieniewski, 2010; Whitty, 2010).  
A decade before the Deepwater Horizon spill, Ulrich Beck (2002) 
predicted that, “in the world of global risks, the mark of neoliberalism rapidly 
loses its credibility to substitute the state and politics through economics.” The 
era of neoliberalism has ushered in a state of deregulation. Within the wake of 
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loosening and removal of federal regulations of offshore drilling has come the 
increase of risk, and ultimately, the loss of lives. When reviewing the events of 
the Deepwater Horizon spill, it is important to note that deregulation has 
largely influenced the level of risk that the communities and workers of 
offshore drilling have and are continuing to be exposed to. 
 
THE EVENTS OF DEEPWATER HORIZON 
 
The Deepwater Horizon explosion occurred after a three decades of 
neoliberal policies and approaches to offshore drilling. According to the 
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Drilling (2010), “Technology, law, and geology pushed oil exploration farther 
from U.S. shores, as land-based exploration became less fruitful, and the 
global demand for energy ramped up.” 
 It is estimated that the Deepwater Horizon spilled 4.9 million barrels of 
crude oil and natural gases were released into the waters forty-one miles off 
of Louisiana’s coast. In the days following the spill, responders, scientists, and 
BP itself would acknowledge the spill as the largest environmental disaster in 
American history (Nyankson, Rodene, and Gupta, 2015). Eleven workers 
were killed aboard the rig, sixteen others sustained serious injuries, and three 
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months passed before the leaking oil could be capped enough to prevent 
further damage to the environment (National Academy of Engineering, 2012).   
A qualitative interview analysis of 139 Louisiana residents showed that 
nearly 50% of locals felt that they lacked information about the Deepwater 
Horizon spill (Simon-Friedt, et al, 2016).  It is being proposed that further 
research into the preemptive risk communication will shed light on patterns of 
communication that may have left Louisianans underinformed about the 
dangers of offshore drilling.  
A content analysis of BP.com will be utilized to uncover weaknesses 
and discrepancies in the risk communicated to community members and 
workers prior to the Deepwater Horizon explosion. Special attention will be 
given to language concerning risk that is rich in scientific jargon and are 
written for high reading level adults as opposed to the general population. It is 
questioned whether much of the risk communication emanating from BP’s 
online sources were largely too complex in nature to adequately inform the 
general populous about risks relating to offshore drilling. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
METHODS AND MATERIALS 
 
 Content analysis has become a common methodology for assessing 
risk communication practices. The methodology is defined by, “a domain of 
techniques designed to explore and describe qualitative verbal, written, and 
multimedia communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative 
manner,” (Crano, Brewer, and Lac, 2015). Said methodology is commonly 
relied upon in the study of risk communication practices due to its ability to 
yield a variety of symbolic cues and shared themes within the human 
experience of accessing and evaluating risk information (Palenchar and 
Heath, 2002).   
 Given the presence of existing literature employing content analysis of 
websites illustrating risk communication practices, the content analysis used 
in this research employs the principles of deductive content analysis whereas 
the researcher, “determined the coding categories and units that will be the 
basis of the coding system prior to conducting the coding,” (Crano, Brewer, 
and Lac, 2015).  
 Coding categories in this research were supported by existing studies 
of online risk communication that employed content analysis, such as Penney 
et al’s 2011 study of risk communication and informed consent. Using past 
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studies’ categories as a basis for determining risk communication categories 
to target for content analysis, ten risk communication items were targeted for 
this research: 
• Reference to offshore drilling: language illustrating the use of offshore 
drilling techniques, the building and maintaining of offshore rigs, and 
exploration of offshore oil deposits 
• Explicit reference to environmental sustainability: such specific 
targeting of language prevents the incorporation of mentions of 
sustainability as it relates to development and finances  
• Evidence of professional membership or certification 
• Explicit reference to safety 
• Explicit reference to cleanups 
• Mention of human health risks 
• Mention of environmental risks: language illustrating the mitigation of 
potential dangers to the environment 
• Reference to reporting requirements 
• Reference to adherence with law 
• Industry specific terms: language that is technical in nature and is 
specific to the energy industry 
 
In addition to the content analysis framed by the aforementioned 
categories, this research also gauged the effectiveness of BP’s online risk 
communication practices by employing the mathematical equation known as 
the Flesch Reading Ease Score. This score is described as, “a test designed 
to assess the comprehension and difficulty of reading passages of 
contemporary academic English,” (Kong and Hu, 2015). According to 
Henderson et al (2015), “Previous research indicates that online health 
information tends to be written at a reading level that is more advanced than 
ability of the general population.” Louisiana in particular has been reported to 
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have the one of the lowest reading proficiencies in the United States (Bacon-
Blood, 2013). Though urban populations have shown higher reading 
proficiency than rural populations (Graham and Teague, 2011), 2015 data 
showed that within the Greater New Orleans area alone, “nearly 40 percent of 
the population aged 16 and older have a literacy rate below that of a 5th-
grader,” (Facts and Statistics, 2016).  
Use of the Flesch Reading Ease Score formula provides insight to the 
appropriateness and reliability of the language used on BP’s website. The 
formula provides a score on a scale of 0 to 100 where the higher the score, 
the more easily readable the text. The architects of the formula describe a 
score of 0 as unreadable and a score of 100 representing language use easily 
understood for a literate individual, (Flesch, 1948). This score is determined 
by the following equation: 
 
Readability ease = 206.835 – (1.015 x Average Sentence Length) – (84.6 x 
Average numbers of syllables per word)  
  
According to Flesch (1946), scores between 90 and 100 are 
appropriate for those at or above a fifth grade reading level. Scores between 
60 and 70 are easily understood by individuals of middle school age. Finally, 
scores of 30 and below illustrates a reading level appropriate for college 
graduates.  
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Three iterations of BP’s website were analyzed for risk communication 
language. A digital library hosted through the non-profit Internet Archive 
allowed the researcher to view the BP.com website in its original form on 
selected dates, specific categories of language based on other studies of risk 
communication effectiveness were identified and catalogued. The iterations 
chosen for this research were BP’s archived website of  
• October 20th, 1996, the earliest available archive of BP.com  
• April 15th, 2010, five days after the Deepwater Horizon spill 
• April 5th, 2016 
 
Each of the website’s pages relevant to the analyzation of risk 
communication were analyzed according to the Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease 
Score formula. Each page of BP.com under the sections of Environment and 
Safety was tabulated for average sentence length, average number of 
syllables per word, and targeted content analysis categories were tallied. 
Flesch reading scores were averaged together representing the readability of 
risk focused pages for each year’s iteration of the website.  
Only content that was available via the HTML website was analyzed, 
not taking into account downloadable documents such as PDFs and graphs. 
These document remained outside of the scope of research as the 
documents were often technical and financial in nature, thus falling outside 
the interest of the general patron of the website seeking information about the 
environment, human health, and offshore drilling. Additionally, such 
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documents are frequently unavailable via internet archives unlike HTML 
snapshots. Furthermore, only featured pages such as those that could be 
accessed from main landing pages were not targeted in the content analysis. 
 
BP ONLINE 
 
 According to web archives, BP unveiled its website to the public in 
autumn of 1996 (Web Archive, 1996). This first iteration of the company’s 
online presence was typical of other websites of the time containing few page 
links and no embedded video. Despite only containing six hyperlinks to pages 
on the website, information on health and safety were present on day one of 
BP’s existence on the information super highway. Under the main tab of What 
We Care About were four hyperlinks of related material labeled, Policies, 
People, the Community, and Health, Safety, and the Environment. Though 
BP’s foray into offshore drilling began long before their foray into cyberspace, 
no mention of offshore drilling is mentioned in the content located via these 
hyperlinked headings. However, in this 1996 iteration of the website there is 
an acknowledgement that, “we aim to reduce total oil discharge to water, 
despite increased drilling activity and continued reservoir depletion,” 
(Environmental Performance, 1996). 
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 Several large scale oil spills occurred between the 1996 iteration of 
BP.com and the 2010 iteration. In 2007 when a new Chief Executive of BP 
settled a series of criminal charges related to these events, the company 
issued a statement pledging to improve their risk management (Mouawad, 
2010).   
 From 1996 until 2005, visitors to BP’s website could not be transported 
via hyperlink to pages about offshore drilling or oil spills directly from the 
homepage as illustrated in figure 1. It is in this 2005 version of the BP website 
that the What We Care About heading was transformed into a homepage 
heading titled Environment and Society indicating an effort to better showcase 
sustainability and safety specifics. This organization of pages and headings 
closely resembles the modern day website as it forms narratives around 
safety and sustainability concerns. Before the 2005 update, users of BP’s 
website could find letters by BP executives rather than specific information 
about ongoing offshore drilling projects as well as environmental and health 
policies relating to offshore drilling.  
Though the language concerning risk became more complex as 
BP.com evolved from 1999 to 2016, it should be noted that the website 
offered more non-text information about risk with each iteration of the website. 
In 1996, BP.com featured no video on the pages targeted by this research. By 
2010, BP.com featured numerous pieces of video content on the subjects of 
human health and environmental risk, as well as hyperlinks to company social 
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media accounts such as YouTube. While literature on the efficacy of risk 
communication presented through text versus video is limited, recent 
research suggests that video can improve individuals understanding and 
retaining of information about risks (Garg et al, 2012). 
Notably missing on BP.com days after the spill was information specific 
to community members within the immediate impact zone of the oil spill. This 
would be remedied in the summer of 2010 with the addition of website content 
that allowed visitors to file claims for damages. The summer 2010 version of 
BP.com also featured a list of emergency hotlines, a section that is not 
featured on the risk communication relevant portions of the website iterations 
analyzed in this research.   
 
 ASSESSING RISK COMMUNICATION WITHIN BP 
 
Palenchar and Heath (2006) claim that, “organizations find reason to 
implement programs whereby they increase publics’ understanding of 
technical processes as a means for lessening the fear of the threatening 
unknown and of increasing trust.”  While a myriad of qualitative risk analyses 
has been performed on the technical systems within projects such as the 
Deepwater Horizon and said event itself, “much less attention has been 
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focused on the human and organizational (sic) factors,” (Skodalen & Vinnem, 
2016).  
 From a post-spill perspective, BP’s communication of risk has been 
analyzed according to federal and state regulations, most notable among 
these, the Emergency Planning and Communication Right-to-know Act 
(EPCRA). The act is described by the Environmental Protection Agency as 
having, “a significant role in protecting human health and the environment 
over the last quarter century by providing communities and emergency 
planners with valuable information on toxic chemical releases in their area,” 
(30 Years of EPCRA, 2016). After being sued by the Center for Biological 
Diversity, a federal judge ruled that BP and Transocean, the owners of the rig 
itself, were not required to communicate risk as dictated by EPCRA due to 
language excluding spills comprised of petroleum (Rodriguez, 2015). 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been a leading 
resource for risk communication and emergency response planning (Baram, 
1985). Despite their initiatives, online EPA documents about risk 
communication provides recommendations for practitioners but do not define 
risk communication as it adheres to federal law aside from corporate 
responsibility to draft contingency plans for environmental risks, (Guidance 
Documents, n.d.). 
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The contingency plan for BP’s Deepwater Horizon rig was approved by 
the EPA and was reviewed as recently as one year before the catastrophe. 
The 582 page document was later noted as being riddled with oversights and 
errors. When documenting area wildlife for the gulf water habitat surrounding 
the rig, the contingency plan erroneously listed animals not present in the 
biosphere, such as sea lions and walruses (Clark, 2010). Additionally the plan 
listed, “a Long-deceased scientist as a recommended expert on wildlife 
contamination,” (Clark, 2010).  
The document described spills much more catastrophic than what 
occurred at Deepwater Horizon, yet made the false statement that even 
events that size, “fish, marine mammals and birds escape serious harm; 
beaches remain pristine; water quality is only a temporary problem,” (BP 
Contingency Plans Vastly Inadequate, 2010). Despite this claim, wildlife was 
reported as being severely impacted and oil reached the shores of Florida 
within days of the spill (Clark, 2010).  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Content analysis of BP.com on selected dates in 1999, 2010, and 2016 
was performed via coding in ten categories of risk community as it related to 
both human health and environmental sustainability. 246 targeted terms were 
identified on BP.com in 1996, with the greatest number of mentions relating to 
language consistent with the description of environmental risks. 456 targeted 
terms were accounted for in the 2010 iteration of BP.com with the most 
numerous targeted items representing language that illustrated environmental 
risk. 396 terms were identified on the 2016 BP.com website with the most 
numerous robust coding category consisting of language describing oil spills. 
These items were illustrated for reference in Figure 2.  
 Each page was analyzed using the Flesch Reading Score Formula. As 
seen in Figure 3, the average score for each targeted website version was 
38.5 for 1996,  36.9 for 2010, and 29.8 in 2016. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
While it may be assumed that BP’s approach to risk communication 
has evolved after being implicit in the largest oil spill in history, as sociologist 
William Freudenburg (1997) states, “…if we do our jobs sufficiently well, our 
points should indeed be obvious, at least in retrospect. One of the surest 
signs that we have been clear in our explanations is when a phenomenon 
becomes obvious through our efforts.” The analysis of targeted risk content in 
this research suggests that increased clarity has not been a byproduct of BP’s 
evolution in cyberspace.  
The average Flesch-Kincaid Reading Score of targeted BP.com pages 
illustrate growing complexity of language with each subsequent iteration of 
the website. As seen in Figure 2, pages related to community health and 
environmental sustainability on the 1996 version of BP.com rated at a Flesch-
Kincaid Reading Score of 38.5. This score for similar pages present on the 
website days after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill rated at 36.9. The score 
for BP.com in 2016 was the lowest of the three with an average Flesch-
Kincaid Reading score of 29.8. According to ratings developed by Flesch 
(1946), each of these score represent language appropriate that would be 
best understandable by college graduates.  
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Half of individuals within the immediate impact zone of the Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill claimed in a qualitative survey that they felt underinformed 
about the risks posed to their community (Simon-Friedt, et al, 2016). Should 
these individuals have accessed BP.com to get more information about 
human health and environmental risks, they would have faced content that 
was written far above the average reading level of the average citizen (Facts 
and Statistics, 2016). As seen in Figure 3, the iterations of BP.com crafted 
years after the spill have only increased in the complexity of its language 
according to this research.  
Community members within the immediate impact zone of the 
Deepwater Horizon that visited BP’s website would have found only 7 specific 
references to offshore drilling on the safety, community, and environmental 
sustainability sections website. Only two utterances of language regarding oil 
spill cleanups were detected in the content analysis. While these numbers 
have grown in updates to the websites, Louisianan’s had very limited access 
to relevant risk information in the days following the Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill. 
In January 2017, the EPA released new regulations under their Risk 
Management Program (RMP). In sum, “The RMP rule requires facilities that 
use extremely hazardous substances to develop Risk Management Plans,” 
(Cave, 2017). As part of these plans, corporations will comply with risk 
communication regulation that will, “require the owner or operator of a 
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stationary source to distribute certain chemical hazard information for all 
regulated processes to the public in an easily accessible manner, such as on 
a company website,” (Accidental Release Prevention Requirements, 2017).  
The regulations, put into action just days before the inauguration of President 
Donald Trump, face an uncertain future as Trump appointed EPA 
Administrator Scott Pruitt has been critical of said regulations in the past, 
(Cave, 2017). Should the Trump administration, known for its emphasis on 
deregulation, it may represent a lack of growth in terms of risk communication 
in the oil industry. 
With the EPA currently facing budget cuts of 31% (Dennis and Eilperin, 
2017), regulatory rollbacks that may occur via this administration will remain 
of interest to risk communication scholars. When new technologies intersect 
with deregulation, it is necessary to analyze environmental and human health 
mishaps when they occur in the future. How and why the risk surrounding 
these events should continue to be compared to past successes and failures 
in risk communication.  
Communication within a Risk Society is defined by, “complex 
knowledge systems that are indecipherable by the general population,” 
(Giddens, 1991). The increase in language complexity on BP.com illustrates a 
growing consistency with the parameters of the theory of Risk Society. When 
Polanyi (1944) stated that the allowing of market mechanisms to be the 
director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment would be 
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the downfall of society, he was speaking of the same forces of deregulation 
that allow companies such as BP to stay silent, or opaque on matters of risk.
 It is inevitable that another disaster resulting in the loss of human life 
and the loss of environmental integrity will occur after the publishing of this 
research. When such an event unfolds, it is the responsibility of industry, the 
public, the media, watchdog groups, and the United States government to 
reflect on the responsibility to better preemptively communicate risk 
surrounding contemporary technologies. The case study of Deepwater 
Horizon illustrates that neoliberal policies that allow companies such as BP to 
police themselves in providing risk communication perpetuates the Risk 
Society, a world that provides increasingly diminishing returns for both society 
and the biotic realm.  
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Figure 1: Archived images of BP.com via the Internet Archive, 1996, 2005, and 
2017 homepages 
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Figure 2: Content analysis of BP.com
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1996 2010 2016
    Offshore   Sustain.      Prof.        Safety      Cleanup    Health       Enviro.   Reporting    Laws      Industry    Spills      
     Drilling                     Memb.                Risks                       Term 
 43 
 
 
 
Figure 3: BP.com average Flesch Reading Score 
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